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I. INTRODUCTION 
James Duane, the executive director of the Ohio-Kentucky-Indiana Regional 
Council of Governments, unflatteringly described Ohio’s zoning practices in 1998 as 
“a patchwork of weak law, fragmented code, and a plethora of court cases. Local 
day-to-day land-use activity appears to center on individual zoning and subdivision 
approvals with little attention to how those discrete actions compose the big 
picture.”1 Duane’s concern arises from Ohio’s “home-rule amendment” under 
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution, which provides that municipalities 
have “authority to exercise all powers of local self-government . . . .”2 
Critics of the amendment, like Ohio State University Agricultural Economics 
Professor Lawrence W. Libby, argue that this home-rule legal and cultural tradition 
impedes regional coordination among Ohio localities.3 Others, like Columbia Law 
School Professor Richard Briffault, go further and argue that local self-interested 
zoning policies impose economic, environmental, and social externalities on the 
region as a whole.4 
This Note argues that Ohio’s home-rule principles foster a regional “race to the 
bottom”5 and proposes that the Ohio General Assembly pass legislation creating 
regional governments to combat the absence of coordination among regional 
localities.   
The fundamental problem under current home-rule principles is informational 
(hereafter the information problem), where localities are blinded from policies that 
affect their economic health because they fail to recognize that regional localities 
operate as interdependent, economic players.6 The information problem prevents 
                                                                                                                                         
 1 Stuart Meck & Jason Wittenberg, Working Paper: A Smart Growth Agenda for Ohio, 
OHIO SMART GROWTH AGENDA (EcoCity Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio), Fall 1998, at 33, 
available at http://www.gcbl.org/files/resources/ecocityjournalv5n101112fall1998.pdf. 
 2 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the 
130th GA 2013-2014).   
 3 Meck & Wittenberg, supra note 1, at 33. 
 4 Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1115, 1147 (1996). 
 5 See id. Because of the absence of regional coordination, interlocal tax competition 
causes wealthier inner city residents to flee to low property tax-rate havens in the suburbs. See 
id. at 1134-35. The inner city’s poorer population drives up per capita costs of local services, 
the city has to raise property taxes to generate needed revenue, and this further reinforces the 
incentives for those with the means to do so to leave the inner city.  Id. at 1137. This interlocal 
tax race causes both urban sprawl and decay in metropolitan urban cities, and this system may 
damage the economic health of the entire metropolitan region. See id. at 1137. 
 6 See id. at 1137. 
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localities from developing the regional consciousness necessary to implement 
meaningful regional coordination. Regional governments would combat the 
information problem by creating a vehicle for regional coordination and an ability to 
internalize a locality’s externalities by forging policies that bind localities.7   
Although regional governments would have to “apply to all parts of the state 
alike”8 to be Constitutional under Article XVIII,9 Section 3, this Note will solely 
focus on the impact of a state’s regional governments on metropolitan areas because 
of their importance, populously and economically.10 
This is not a call for more government, but a call to streamline already existing 
government into more efficient mechanisms with sufficient authority to direct 
regional land-use issues. In the last fifty years, states have combated regional issues 
through “special purpose governments.”11 Special-purpose governments, like the 
Ohio Development Services Agency (ODSA),12 are independent public agencies 
created under state law to combat specific issues.13 A special-purpose government’s 
limited purpose can lead to hundreds of independent agencies within a metropolitan 
area.14 The profusion of municipal15 and special purpose governments within a 
metropolitan area16 dilutes a special purpose government’s political accountability 
                                                                                                                                         
 7 Id. at 1122. 
 8 City of Canton v. Ohio, 95 Ohio St. 3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, at ¶ 21 
(Ohio 2010). 
 9 See id. 
 10 Briffault, supra note 4, at 1116 (“most Americans live not in discrete, compact 
localities, but rather in sprawling metropolitan areas.  In 1990, 193 million people, or 78 
percent of the total population of the United States, lived in metropolitan areas, as defined by 
the Census Bureau.”). 
 11 See Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1781 
(2002). 
 12 See OHIO DEVELOPMENT SERVICES AGENCY, http://development.ohio.gov/feat 
/whatisdsa.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). The ODSA is charged with the responsibility to 
attract and retain jobs in Ohio. Id 
 13 See Frug, supra note 11, at 1781. 
 14 Id. at 1783. 
 15 Cleveland’s County, Cuyahoga County, has about 58 units of government. Joe Frolik, 
Regional Government vs. Home Rule, TEACHING CLEVELAND 7, http://www.teachingcleveland.org 
/index.php?option=com_content&view= article&id=602:regional-government-vs-home-rule-
&catid=50:regional-govt-vs-home-rule&Itemid=124. Also considering school districts and special 
taxing districts, there are about 100 units of government in Cuyahoga County. Id.  
 16 See Frug, supra note 11, at 1784.  
Not one major metropolitan area is governed by a single all-encompassing general 
purpose local government. Some metropolitan areas have special-purpose regional 
governmental entities. These bodies, however, are sometimes limited in territorial 
scope to just a portion of the metropolitan area. They are typically governed by 
appointed rather than elected officials. Most importantly, they nearly always lack the 
plenary taxing, regulatory, and service-delivery authority characteristic of general 
purpose municipal governments.  
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because of voter confusion, apathy, and the fact that special purpose governments 
are typically run by unelected political appointees.17   
This Note will discuss in Part II (A) how home rule became law in Ohio, (B) 
what regional problems critics attribute to home-rule principles, (C) the principal 
arguments for home rule, and (D) what regional governments other states have 
implemented.   
Part III addresses how a regional consciousness would internalize the 
information problem. In exploring this theory, I analyze (A) how regional 
governments would be constitutional under Ohio’s home-rule amendment; (B) why 
statutory intervention by the state is needed to solve this problem; and (C) how 
regional governments present a more effective structure for the economic health of 
Ohio’s regions. 
II. HOME RULE IN OHIO 
A. How Home Rule Became Law in Ohio 
During the nineteenth century, the response to regional fragmentation was 
annexation.18 All major cities during this period—Boston, New York, Philadelphia, 
Chicago, and Cleveland—grew by annexing their suburbs.19 In 1890, New York City 
grew to 1.4 million residents on Manhattan, and across the river, the City of 
Brooklyn grew twentyfold between 1840 and 1890.20 In the face of opposition from 
wealthy suburbanites in Brooklyn, New York’s state legislature consolidated 
Brooklyn and four other boroughs into New York City in 1898 to create the world’s 
largest city and first metropolitan government.21 For the next five decades, New 
York operated as largely its own suburbs, and the city thrived as one of the most 
successful urban communities in the country with the best hospitals, schools, and 
city services.22  
Ohio’s General Assembly during the early nineteenth century went the other 
direction by enhancing the power of its municipalities to prevent annexation.23 
Cleveland’s population, too, was booming in the early twentieth century, as its 
population grew from 381,000 in 1900 to 797,000 in 1920 and became the fifth 
largest city in the country.24 As in New York City, overpopulation in the inner city  
                                                                                                                                         
Briffault, supra note 4, at 1117.  
 17 See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1146. 
 18 Id. at 1117. 
 19 Id. 
 20 DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 18 (2d ed. 1995). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 19. Between 1900 and 1950, New York City captured over 50 percent of its 
suburban growth; after 1990, the city contributed -13 percent of its suburban growth.  This 
comparison demonstrates that when New York City was a metropolitan government, the city 
thrived. When operating as a central city to a metropolitan region, as it did after 1950, the 
city’s problems began. Id.  
 23 See Frolik, supra note 15, at 3. 
 24 Id. 
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led those with the means to do so to move to the suburbs, and a cordon of suburbs 
quickly incorporated around the city.25 But unlike the consolidation of New York 
City, Cleveland’s suburbs, armed with new home-rule powers in 1912, successfully 
parried any further annexation efforts by Cleveland during its formative population 
boom.26 
Before Ohio’s home-rule amendment was ratified in 1912, the state had 
preemption authority to override any law passed by a locality.27 Under “Dillon’s 
Rule,” Ohio municipalities were only able to exercise those powers delegated by the 
General Assembly.28 Progressives, who advocated for greater self-autonomy, railed 
against state preemption of local decisions.29 As this was before the advent of the 
interstate highway system, municipalities were relatively autonomous and still had 
vast tracts of vacant land within their limits.30 Newton Baker, a Progressive who was 
elected Mayor of Cleveland in 1911, convinced Ohio’s 1912 Constitutional 
Convention to add strong home-rule language to Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 
Ohio Constitution.31 
Ohio’s home-rule amendment says, “[m]unicipalities shall have authority to 
exercise all powers of local self-government and to adopt and enforce within their 
limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in conflict 
with general laws.”32 With the addition of the landmark decision by the Supreme 
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., which held local zoning33 to be 
constitutional,34 suburban independence was further enhanced by empowering them 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 25 See id. at 3-4. 
 26 See id. at 5. In 1912, delegates proposed, and the electorate later ratified in the fall, 
strong home-rule language to Ohio’s Constitution at the fourth Ohio Constitutional 
Convention. Melanie Shwab, Note, Crossing the Home-Rule Boundaries Should Be 
Mandatory: Advocating for a Watershed Approach to Zoning and Land Use in Ohio, 58 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 463, 485 (2010). 
 27 See Frolik, supra note 15, at 3.  
 28 See Shwab, supra note 26, at 485. 
 29 See Frolik, supra note 15, at 3.  
 30 Id. at 7.  
 31 Id. at 3. 
 32 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the 
130th GA 2013-2014). 
 33 “The legislative division of a region, esp. a municipality, into separate districts with 
different regulations within the districts for land use, building size, and the like.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1757 (10th ed. 2014).  
 34 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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to use exclusionary zoning35 to shield themselves36 from undesirable outgrowth of 
the inner-city.37 
B. Regional Problems Critics Attribute to Home-Rule Principles 
Today, critics of home-rule principles (hereafter regionalists) argue that cities, 
like Cleveland, which are locked in by their suburbs and bereft of means to either 
grow geographically or coordinate meaningfully with other localities are at a 
competitive disadvantage.38 The disadvantage is that these cities do not 
proportionally share in the growth of their metropolitan areas and are devoid of 
means to adequately address regional issues with regional solutions.39   
David Rusk, a regionalist and former mayor of Albuquerque, New Mexico, calls 
these types of cities “inelastic cities.”40 Rusk says inelastic cities “[cannot] compete 
with new suburbs in offering the desired suburban-style model for family life.”41 
Incapable of capturing a share of suburban-type development, inelastic cities 
disproportionately fail to capture the growth of their metropolitan areas.42 “A mostly 
built-out county[,] like Cuyahoga County[,] operates at a bit of a disadvantage. 
Family sizes are smaller than years ago; so it takes more homes—usually new 
homes—to grow. The fastest growing places usually have a lot of previously 
undeveloped land.”43   
By contrast, Columbus, Ohio, an elastic city, has remained elastic in the face of 
Ohio’s home-rule amendment because the city used its water and sewer system as a 
means to geographically grow within Franklin County.44 Between 1953 and 2013, 
Columbus grew from 39 to more than 210 square miles by requiring localities that 
wanted access to its water and sewer systems to annex to the city.45 Former 
Cleveland Planning Director, Hunter Morrison, said, “‘[t]he energy (of development) 
                                                                                                                                         
 35 “Exclusionary zoning has been defined as land use regulation which raises the price 
of residential access to a particular area and thereby denies that access to members of low 
income groups.” Stuart Meck & Kenneth Pearlman, Oh. Plan. & Zoning L. § 6:13, in 
BALDWIN'S OHIO HANDBOOK SERIES OHIO PLANNING AND ZONING LAW (2014 ed.). 
 36 “[T]he goal of incorporation was often very clearly to create an enclave for ‘our 
people.’ Sometimes that was people who looked or prayed alike. Other times, the restrictions 
were more economic in nature . . . . ‘The impetus for zoning in Northeast Ohio was exclusion’ 
. . . .”  Frolik, supra note 16, at 5. 
 37 See id. at 4-5. 
 38 See RUSK, supra note 20, at 20. 
 39 See id.  
 40 Id. 
 41 Id.  
 42 Id. 
 43 Rich Exner, Census Estimates Show Greater Cleveland Population Down Slightly, THE 
PLAIN DEALER (Mar. 17, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/datacentral 
/index.ssf/2013/03/census_estimates_show_greater.html. 
 44 See Frolik, supra note 15, at 6. 
 45 Id. 
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goes to the new,’ - and when a business or a developer wants to build something new 
in Central Ohio, Columbus has room for them to do it.”46  
Cities that have flourished in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, like 
Houston, Phoenix, San Diego, and Albuquerque have all done so through the 
regional solution of annexation.47 A combination of permissive annexation laws, 
restrictions on the incorporation of new cities on the urban fringe, and political will 
enabled annexation in these cities.48  
Today, Columbus is growing jobs at a rate more than three times the rest of 
Ohio.49 From April 1 through June 30, 2013, Columbus’s job rate grew 1.6 percent, 
while the state’s was at .5 percent.50 Columbus is the only big city in Ohio and 
western Pennsylvania whose population grew faster than the nation’s since 1980.51 
One cited reason for this has been Columbus’s ability to “streamlin[e] government 
and invest[] in the right things.”52   
From 2011 to 2012, Cuyahoga County lost 4,872 residents, the second biggest 
decline in the country during that period and second only to Detroit’s Wayne 
County.53 It also may be getting worse.54 USA Today reported in 2011 that Cleveland 
lost 17% of its population from 2001 to 2011 and saw more residents abandon the 
city from 2000 to 2010 than in the 1990s.55 
In inelastic cities unable to capture regional growth, metropolitan growth is not 
only disproportionately exported to its suburbs but the regions also reflect a sharp 
income and racial disparity between city and county.56 A 2009 U.S. Census Bureau 
Survey revealed that Cuyahoga County had a median household income of $41,101, 
while Cleveland’s median household income was $24,687.57 The African American 
and Hispanic populations surrounding inelastic cities are typically concentrated in 
                                                                                                                                         
 46 Id. at 6. 
 47 Frug, supra note 11, at 1769. 
 48 See id.  
 49 Mark Williams, Central Ohio Leads the Way in Job Growth, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH 
(Aug. 15, 2013, 1:43 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/public/2013/08/14 
/central-ohio-added-jobs-in-second-quarter.html. 
 50 Id.  
 51 Id.  
 52 Rana Foroohar, How Columbus, Ohio Bounced Back from the Recession, TIME 
MAGAZINE (Sept. 27, 2012), available at http://business.time.com/2012/09/27/how-columbus-
ohio-bounced-back-from-the-recession/. 
 53 Exner, supra note 43.  
 54 See Dennis Cauchon, Population Drastically Declines in Ohio Cities, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 10, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/census/2011-03-09-ohio-
census_N.htm. 
 55 Id.  
 56 See Frolik, supra note 15.  
 57 Robert L. Smith, Census Shows Cleveland Is the Second-Poorest City in The United 
States, THE PLAIN DEALER (Sept. 29, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro 
/2010/09/census_shows_cleveland_is_the.html. 
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the inner city.58 “[T]he segregation and concentration of impoverished populations in 
specific areas . . . increase[s] the social and public costs of income inequality.”59 This 
destabilizing feature of inelastic cities stirs up racial, political, and social tensions 
and makes it less likely for regions to develop a regional consciousness.60 
But while suburbs disproportionately capture metropolitan growth, they still 
continue to rely on central cities as the setting of many specialized activities—like 
work settings, cultural amenities, sports venues, and medical services.61 Not only do 
affluent regional localities surrounding inelastic cities “free ride” by benefiting from 
metropolitan living and sharing in few metropolitan costs,62 but these localities also 
maintain this position by using exclusionary zoning.63 By means of a wealth test, 
exclusionary zoning keeps out undesirables who bring less to a locality’s tax base 
than costs in social services.64   
When one regional locality uses exclusionary zoning, this triggers other localities 
to do the same to prevent undesirable growth from being diverted to them.65 The 
aggregate use of exclusionary zoning causes urban sprawl by driving up home prices 
and forcing new homeowners to seek cheaper housing in the metropolitan fringe.66 
Over the last quarter-century, “many metropolitan areas have experienced far greater 
territorial expansion than population growth.”67 
This “leapfrog pattern of development” has substantial costs on a region.68 The 
geographic growth of a metropolitan area consumes natural resources and 
environmentally sensitive areas.69 According to Smart Growth America,70 “the 
degree of sprawl is more strongly related to the severity of maximum ozone days [in 
a metropolitan area] than per capita income or employment levels.”71 By curbing 
                                                                                                                                         
 58 RUSK, supra note 20, at 27. 
 59 Myron Orfield & Nicholas Wallace, The Minnesota Fiscal Disparities Act of 1971: The 
Twin Cities’ Struggle and Blueprint for Regional Cooperation, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
591, 604 (2007).  
 60 See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1142. 
 61 See id. at 1139. 
 62 See id. at 1149. 
 63 See id. at 1139-41. 
 64 Id. at 1136. 
 65 Id. at 1134. 
 66 See id. at 1133.   
 67 Id. at 1135. 
 68 Id.  
 69 Id.  
 70 “Smart Growth America is the only national organization dedicated to researching, 
advocating for and leading coalitions to bring smart growth practices to more communities 
nationwide.” SMART GROWTH AMERICA, http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/about/ (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2014).  
 71 REID EWING ET AL., MEASURING SPRAWL AND ITS IMPACT, SMART GROWTH AMERICA, 23 
(2002), available at http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/research/measuring-sprawl-and-its-
impact/.  
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urban sprawl and implementing controlled planning, a 1992 study by the Center for 
Urban Studies at Rutgers University projected that over a 20-year span New Jersey 
would save $1.38 billion in local roads, state roads, water, sewer, and school costs.72 
It would also save 30,000 acres of farmland, 2.5 million gallons of water use, and 
800,000 gallons of sewage.73  
Today, Ohio is one of the most land-hungry states in the nation74 and the state’s 
home-rule principles reinforce this problem.75 Even though between 1950 and 2002 
Ohio ranked 22nd in the country for population growth, it ranked 2nd for rate of 
prime farmland loss, where the state lost 7 million acres in that period.76 The 
farmland loss is greatest in metropolitan fringe communities, where development 
pressure is highest.77 The trend of outward migration has resulted in high rates of 
abandonment in metropolitan inner cities and new development on the metropolitan 
fringe that is expensive for taxpayers to build and maintain.78 
Ohio’s loss of farmland and degree of urban sprawl is also reflected in the 
changing trends of its population density.79 Between 1979-2006, the average person 
per acre in Northeast Ohio declined 22 percent.80 In the 1980s and 1990s, 
Youngstown, Ohio lost about 40 percent of its population, and between 1960 and 
2000, Cleveland lost almost two-thirds of its assessed property valuation.81 Rusk 
says “[t]o end Cleveland’s isolation you need a regional solution. You need to open 
up economically . . . . If you don’t, it will affect the economic competitiveness of the 
entire region.”82 
                                                                                                                                         
 72 Id.  
 73 Id.  
 74 See David Beach, The Smart Growth Challenge in Ohio, FUNDERS’ NETWORK FOR 
SMART GROWTH AND LIVABLE COMMUNITIES (EcoCity Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, OH), 
Oct. 2002, at 13, available at http://www.gcbl.org/files/resources/ohiosmartgrowth0210.pdf 
(“Ohio’s ‘developed land’ increased 21.0% during the 1990s compared to a 4.7% increase in 
population-a 4.5 ratio of growth in developed land to population growth.  This was the sixth 
worst ratio among all states, according to a recent study by urban analyst David Rusk.”). 
 75 See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1134-35. 
 76 Marc Kovac, Ohio Ranks Second in Nation for Loss of Farmland, THE DAILY RECORD 
(Dec. 14, 2004), http://www.the-daily-record.com/farm/2004/12/14/ohio-ranks-second-in-
nation-for-loss-of-farmland. 
 77 Id.  
 78 Vibrant NEO 2040: A Vision, Framework, and Action Products for Our Future, 
NORTHEAST OHIO SUSTAINABLE CMTYS. CONSORTIUM INITIATIVE (NEOSCC, Cleveland, OH), 
Feb. 2014, at 31-32, available at http://vibrantneo.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Vibrant-
NEO-Final-Report_3-31-14_lowres_ALL.pdf. 
 79 See NORTHEAST OHIO SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES CONSORTIUM, Northeast Ohio’s 
Population Has Been Spreading Out, http://cat.neoscc.org/findings/population-
decline/northeast-ohios-population-has-been-spreading-out/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
 80 Id. 
 81 See Beach, supra note 74, at 14. 
 82 Past the Point of No Return?, MOVING TO CORN FIELDS (EcoCity Cleveland, Cleveland 
Heights, OH), 1996, at 60, available at http://www.gcbl.org/files/resources 
/movingtocornfields.pdf. 
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Because public services are primarily funded by a locality’s tax base, an affluent 
locality with an ample tax base can provide better services at a lower tax rate.83 Both 
the better services and lower tax rates further attract the region’s affluent.84 More 
affluent localities maintain this position by deploying “exclusionary zoning 
techniques as an informal wealth test that keeps out newcomers who bring less to the 
locality in tax base than cost in local services . . . .”85 The flight of inner-cities’ 
affluent will reinforce the disparity in tax burdens and local services within a 
region.86 “Poverty in metropolitan areas is increasingly concentrated in the older, so-
called central city and in older suburbs.”87   
The concentration of a region’s poor into these localities tends to drive up the 
costs of local services, which requires these localities to raise tax rates to provide 
“lower quality basic services.”88 The higher tax rates and lower quality services of a 
locality with greater concentrations of a region’s poor provide that locality’s affluent 
with just another incentive to leave.89 In an interview with the Wilson Center, Rusk 
said,  
There’s a ninety-percent correlation between the elasticity of a city, as 
measured by its ability to capture the growth of its central county or 
counties, and its current municipal-bond rating . . . I don’t need to know 
who the mayor is, or the council, or what form of government they have, 
or anything about it. Just tell me . . . what is the elasticity of the city, and I 
can pretty well tell you what the bond rating of that city is going to be.90 
Decaying inner cities can also hurt a region by impeding a region’s ability to 
compete in an increasingly globalized world.91 “In the long run . . . interlocal 
competition, interlocal wealth disparities, and the resulting inferior services and 
infrastructure in central cities can bring down the economic base of the region as a 
whole . . . .”92   
Metropolitan areas are the face of a region, and in some states, the face of the 
state.93 But regions with a deteriorating urban core, social tensions, and 
                                                                                                                                         
 83 Briffault, supra note 4, at 1136. 
 84 See id. at 1136-37.  
 85 Id. at 1136.  
 86 See id. at 1137.  
 87 Id. 
 88 Id.  
 89 Id.  
 90 Dialogue at the Wilson Center: Cities Without Suburbs, WILSON CENTER (MHz 
Networks broadcast Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/dialogue-program/cities-
without-suburbs. 
 91 See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1137-41. 
 92 Id. at 1140. 
 93 See Beach, supra note 74, at 13.   
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environmental problems94 have trouble attracting businesses and competing 
globally.95 Cleveland’s suburbs shared in the pain suffered by Cleveland between 
2000 and 2010.96 “Nearby suburbs shrank, too, although some growth occurred in 
distant suburbs.”97 
Urban sprawl further exacerbates a region’s ability to globally compete because 
of the cost to taxpayers, demonstrated by the high correlation between a metropolitan 
area’s size and the number of local governments.98 This cost reflects increased 
administrative costs of more mayors, governmental personnel, school districts, 
police, and firemen.99 But this cost also reflects the less obvious costs of overlapping 
regional infrastructure and providing services to distant localities.100 Abandonment 
of the inner city also incurs costs of the loss of homeowner equity, visual blight, 
demolition, and maintenance of an infrastructure for non-existent residents.101   
Even though Franklin County has less than 80,000 less residents than Cuyahoga 
County,102 it spends far less money on government.103 Cuyahoga County, a county 
with 457.19 square miles104 and fifty-nine municipal governments,105 spends $800 
million more per year than Franklin County,106 a county with 532.19 square miles107 
and forty three municipal governments.108 “Researchers hired by The Fund For Our 
Economic Future-a foundation-driven consortium that is trying to jumpstart 
development in Northeast Ohio-have identified the ‘legacy cost’ of excess 
government as a drag on this region’s growth because it adds to the bottom-line of 
doing almost everything.”109 
                                                                                                                                         
 94 “Sprawling development destroys valuable farm land open space, natural areas and 
streams.” Why Worry about Suburban Sprawl?, MOVING TO CORN FIELDS (EcoCity Cleveland, 
Cleveland Heights, OH), 1996, at 17, available at 
http://www.gcbl.org/files/resources/movingtocornfields.pdf. 
 95 See Beach, supra note 74, at 13.   
 96 See Cauchon, supra note 54. 
 97 Id.  
 98 See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1120. 
 99 See Beach, supra note 74, at 24. 
 100 See id.  
 101 VIBRANT NEO 2014, supra note 78, at 33-34.  
 102 Exner, supra note 43.  
 103 Frolik, supra note 15, at 7. 
 104 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS (2013), available at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39/39035.html.  
 105 Frolik, supra note 15, at 7. 
 106 Id. 
 107 UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS (2013), available at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39/39049.html . 
 108 See FRANKLIN COUNTY, CITIES, TOWNSHIPS, & VILLAGES, 
www.franklincountyohio.gov/fc/content/citTownVil.cfm (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). 
 109 Frolik, supra note 15, at 7. 
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James Frank, associate professor of urban and regional planning at Florida State 
University, estimated in 1989 that providing services to a three-unit per acre 
development located ten miles from central facilities and employment centers costs 
taxpayers a $48,000 premium.110 This premium cost reflects providing infrastructure 
costs, like water mains, schools, fire stations, treatment plants, and roads.111 By 
placing that same home closer to central facilities in a twelve-unit per acre 
development with an equal mix of townhouses, garden apartments, and single-family 
homes, the premium cost could be reduced fifty percent.112   
Although regional governments can contract with other localities to address 
regional issues,113 affluent regional localities will not delegate their land-use 
authority because they would be agreeing to share in metropolitan costs, like 
affordable housing, social services, and a reduction in its taxable base.114 Thus, state 
intervention is needed for regional land-use coordination to occur.115 
C. Home-Rule Advocates’ Principal Arguments 
Home-rule advocates (hereafter localists) justify their support by arguing that 
localism fosters citizen participation, community, and efficiency.116 Localists argue 
that by taking power out of the hands of local governments regionalism threatens a 
core value of local autonomy.117 Small government fosters civic participation 
because the greater a citizen’s impact, the more likely that citizen will participate in 
                                                                                                                                         
 110 Kevin Kasowski, Sprawling Development Costs All of Us a Bundle, MOVING TO CORN 
FIELDS (EcoCity Cleveland, Cleveland Heights), 1996, at 24, available at 
http://www.gcbl.org/files/resources/movingtocornfields.pdf. 
 111 Id.  
 112 Id.  
 113 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §167.01 (West, Westlaw through Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the 
130th GA 2013-2014) (“[G]overning bodies of any two or more counties, municipal 
corporations, townships, special districts, school districts, or other political subdivisions may 
enter into an agreement with each other, or with the governing bodies of any counties, 
municipal corporations, townships, special districts, school districts or other political 
subdivisions of any other state to the extent that laws of such other state permit, for 
establishment of a regional council consisting of such political subdivisions.”). 
 114 See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1122. 
 115 See Beach, supra note 74, at 24; see also Briffault, supra note 4, at 1122 (“Such 
interlocal agreements are less likely when they require the cooperation of several localities 
scattered across a metropolitan region, or when the benefits are long-term and diffuse while 
the costs, in terms of loss of local regulatory or fiscal autonomy, are immediate and concrete. 
As a result, interlocal agreements are unlikely to affect local exclusionary land use practices or 
the current immunity of the local tax base from the revenue needs of other localities.”). 
 116 See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: 
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1998-2002 (2000); Briffault, 
supra note 4, at 1123. 
 117 Briffault, supra note 4, at 1121; see also  FAYETTE COUNTY ISSUES TEA PARTY, 
http://fayettecountyissuesteaparty.org/Pages/Regionalism.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) 
(“The [Fayette County Issues Tea Party] supports local (or home) rule and freedom of 
association; therefore, it strongly opposes regionalism’s concept of forced centralized 
governance.”). 
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government.118 Civic participation also generates a sense of community among 
citizens by empowering them to shape their localities.119 “[Localists] contend that 
home rule should be preserved to ensure that people can define the character of the 
communities in which they live.”120 The multitude of government under home-rule 
principles most efficiently allocates the best mix of taxes and services by citizens 
voting with their feet.121   
Localists argue that a regional government would subject large numbers of 
people to policies they oppose and to a government whose performance is more 
difficult to monitor.122 “[T]he standard arguments for home rule seek to defend the 
local freedom and choice that anti-sprawl reform appears to threaten.”123 Localists 
use Ohio’s home-rule amendment as legal justification to protect these principles and 
combat new programs that would preempt local autonomy.124  
D. Today’s Regional Alternative 
Nevertheless, advocates of regional solutions have successfully implemented 
regional solutions around the country.125 Minneapolis-Saint Paul created a regional 
institution with members appointed by the governor and vested with authority over 
issues such as transit, water quality, airports, and land-use.126 The Twin Cities 
Metropolitan Council’s most distinctive feature is regional revenue-sharing.127 “The 
Twin Cities tax-base-sharing program was an attempt to respond to a number of 
concerns, including increased property tax rates, tax-base and tax-rate disparities, 
and interjurisdictional competition for development.”128 The program requires each 
jurisdiction to contribute forty percent of the growth in the value of its commercial-
industrial tax capacity to a regional pool.129 
                                                                                                                                         
 118 See Cashin, supra note 116, at 1998-99. “For some, home rule is worth protecting 
because it ensures that governmental power is exercised closest to the people.” David J. 
Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2259 (2003).  
 119 Barron, supra note 118, at 2255. 
 120 Id. at 2259-60. 
 121 See Cashin, supra note 116, at 2000. “For others, home rule is important because it 
establishes a ‘market in places’ that promotes efficient competition in the provision of 
municipal services.” Barron, supra note 118, at 2259.  
 122 See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1144. 
 123 Barron, supra note 118, at 2260. 
 124 See Meck & Wittenberg, supra note 1, at 31; see also Briffault, supra note 4, at 1171 
(“Hostility to metropolitan government is intertwined with a commitment to local autonomy 
that is deeply rooted in both law and politics.”). 
 125 Frug, supra note 11, at 1777. 
 126 Id.  
 127 Id.  
 128 Orfield & Wallace, supra note 59, at 592.  
 129 Id. at 592.  
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Portland, Oregon, elects a regional body called a “Metro” that is authorized to 
regionally plan transportation and land-use but has no revenue-sharing feature.130 
Included in the Metro’s ability to regionally plan land-use is the authority to enact 
regional growth boundaries.131 The Metro’s goal in managing the urban growth 
boundary in the Portland metropolitan area is to protect rural lands and focus 
investment in existing downtowns, main streets, and employment areas.132 In a 2002 
study by Smart Growth America measuring sprawl in eighty-three metropolitan 
areas, Portland ranked eighth,133 and the study cited the Metro’s growth boundary a 
“model” to combat sprawl.134 
Although Minneapolis and Portland are a positive step according to regionalists, 
neither government realizes many regionalists’ goal of a popularly elected regional 
government capable of regional revenue sharing and forging binding land-use 
policies.135  Because of political opposition to a centralized metropolitan 
government, reformers have developed “federative” systems of governments that 
would move only some municipal functions to a regional body, like a county.136 In 
the 1950s and 1960s, this scheme was developed in Miami-Dade County, Nashville-
Davidson County, Jacksonville-Duval County, and Indianapolis-Marion County.137 
Or, as demonstrated in New York City and Columbus, another politically viable 
regional alternative has been to impose regional structures over existing local 
governments.138  
The major American cities that have flourished in the twentieth and 
twenty first centuries . . . [have all done so through] annex[ing] 
neighboring territory, sometimes with the consent of those being absorbed 
(Los Angeles, Nashville, Jacksonville), sometimes with the consent only 
                                                                                                                                         
 130 Frug, supra note 11, at 1777. 
 131 See EWING ET AL., supra note 71, at 23. 
 132 METRO, Urban Growth Boundary (last visited Feb. 1, 2014), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20131219185801/http://www.oregonmetro.gov/index.cfm/go/by.w
eb/id=277 (showing webpage as it appeared on Feb. 1, 2014).  
The boundary controls urban expansion onto farm and forest lands. Land inside the 
urban growth boundary supports urban services such as roads, water and sewer 
systems, parks, schools and fire and police protection that create thriving places to 
live, work and play. The urban growth boundary is one of the tools used to protect 
farms and forests from urban sprawl and to promote the efficient use of land, public 
facilities and services inside the boundary.  
Id.  
 133 Id. at 16. 
 134 See id. at 23.  
 135 Frug, supra note 11, at 1777-78; see also Briffault, supra note 4, at 1117 (noting “[n]ot 
one major metropolitan area is governed by a single all-encompassing general purpose local 
government.”). 
 136 Briffault, supra note 4, at 1118. 
 137 Id.  
 138 Id. 
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of the property owners in the annexed areas (Phoenix), and sometimes 
without asking anyone’s permission (Houston, Oklahoma City, 
Albuquerque).139  
North Carolina’s involuntary annexation statutes, for example, have been cited 
by regionalists, like David Rusk, as one of the most “progressive” in the country in 
terms of providing their municipalities the ability to expand their corporate 
boundaries. “Because North Carolina has historically allowed ‘involuntary’ 
annexation at the discretion of local municipalities, such municipalities have been 
able to expand their territories, gain favorable debt finance ratings, and enhance their 
tax bases more readily than many municipalities in other parts of the country.”140 
Although regional solutions vary depending on the political landscape, 
regionalists argue that any regional government that can preempt local land-use 
decisions would substantially facilitate a regional consciousness.141 
III. HOW A REGIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD  
INTERNALIZE THE INFORMATION PROBLEM 
By not considering regional externalities, localists fail to recognize that home-
rule principles inhibit civic participation, community, and efficiency.142 This is 
because focusing on a locality’s self-interest blinds citizens from their decisions’ 
regional impact.143 The absence of regional governments prevents citizens from 
participating in regional governmental affairs, recognizing their regional community, 
and efficiently allocating a region’s resources.144 “Government should design and 
finance public services on a scale commensurate with the scope of their costs and 
benefits. If they are not designed on the appropriate scale, then local and regional 
interests diverge.”145 
An effective regional government that is popularly elected and can preempt local 
land-use, on the other hand, could better converge a region’s interest.146 One 
important way a regional government would do this is through facilitating a regional 
consciousness.147 A regional government requiring interlocal participation would 
force localities to consider their policies’ regional impact.148 Mandated participation 
                                                                                                                                         
 139 Frug, supra note 11, at 1768. As an example, North Carolina has Involuntary 
Annexation Statutes, which would permit a city to involuntarily annex only areas contiguous 
to the city that share at least one-eighth of their external boundaries with that city. Judith 
Welch Wegner, North Carolina’s Annexation Wars: Whys, Wherefores, and What Next, 91 
N.C. L. REV. 165, 196-97 (2012). 
 140 Id. at 168.  
 141 See Frug, supra note 11, at 1827. 
 142 See Briffault, supra note 4, at 1164. 
 143 See id. 
 144 See id. 
 145 Orfield & Wallace, supra note 59, at 604 (citations omitted).  
 146 See Frug, supra note 11, at 1792.  
 147 See id.  
 148 See id.  
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would facilitate interlocal negotiation, which could, in turn, help internalize 
externalities on emitting localities.149 Affluent localities that choose, for example, to 
use exclusionary zoning and not provide any affordable housing, could be subject 
under a regional government to compensate regional localities whose taxable bases 
are damaged by this policy.  
According to David Beach, one of the reasons Ohio was one of only twelve states 
in 2002 not pursuing statewide reforms in advancing smart growth was because of 
Ohio’s lack of an identity.150 Because Ohio has more large urban areas than any 
other state in the Union, the media are fragmented, there are no common sources of 
information, no one in Cincinnati knows anything about Dayton, no one in Dayton 
knows anything about Columbus, and when you want to change state policies there 
is a tremendous educational challenge.151 Ohio’s topography also plays a factor in 
Ohio’s cultural fragmentation, as the state is split up into five physiographic 
regions.152 “Such divisions . . . make it extremely difficult to convene a statewide 
discussion on any topic, much less enact any comprehensive statewide reforms.”153 
Consequently, even though abrogating Ohio’s home-rule amendment may be the 
most legally direct means of granting regional governments authority to preempt 
local land-use authority, doing so would have to overcome tremendous political 
hurdles.154 Ohio’s cultural fragmentation, strong home-rule tradition, and the 
codification of the amendment in Ohio’s Constitution for over a century would make 
the abrogation of the amendment a colossal task.155  
But Ohio courts have increasingly marginalized the home-rule amendment over 
the past decade.156 This has opened the door for the General Assembly to 
                                                                                                                                         
 149 See id.  
 150 Beach, supra note 74, at 9. 
 151 Id.  
While people feel attachment to some part of the state (a city, watershed, or region), 
they tend not to identify with Ohio as a whole. And that is understandable. Ohio has 
no coherent geography, no political or cultural center of gravity, and no mythology 
that celebrates it as a distinctive place.  
Id.  
 152 Id. The five physiographic regions are Glaciated Allegheny Plateau, Unglaciated 
Allegheny Plateau, Central Lowland Till Plains, Huron-Erie Lake Plains, and Interior Low 
Plateau. Id.  
 153 Id. at 10.  
 154 See Orfield & Wallace, supra note 59, at 604.  
 155 See id. Ohio localities may especially be reluctant to abrogate Ohio’s home-rule amendment 
lately because the amendment has been used as a legal defense to protect their communities from 
the environmental effects of oil and gas drilling. See Anne Foster, Local Ohio Communities Allied 
in Defense of Ohio’s Home-Rule, Oil and Gas Showdown To Be Held in Ohio’s Supreme Court, 
NORTH AMERICA SHALE BLOG (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.northamericashaleblog.com/2013 
/09/18/local-ohio-communities-allied-in-defense-of-the-ohios-home-rule-oil-and-gas-showdown-
to-be-held-in-ohio-supreme-court/.  
 156 See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No.  2013–0465, 2015-Ohio-485 
(Ohio Feb. 17, 2015); City of Cleveland v. Ohio, 128 Ohio St. 3d 135, 2010-Ohio-6318, 942 
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constitutionally enact a statute creating regional governments that can preempt local 
land-use in the face of Article XVIII, Section 3.157  
A. The Constitutionality of Regional Governments to Preempt  
Local Zoning under Canton 
Article XVIII, Section 3 provides that municipalities have all powers of local 
self-government “and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, 
sanitary and other similar regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.”158 For 
a regional government to have sufficient authority to preempt a municipality’s land-
use decisions, it must be permitted to do so by a “general law” within the meaning of 
Art. XVIII, Section 3.159 Under this amendment, when municipal zoning conflicts 
with the “general laws of the state,” the ordinance is unconstitutional.160   
Ohio considers municipal zoning to be an exercise of the state’s police powers 
and not an exercise of local self-government.161 If an exercise of local self-
government, “the analysis stops, because Ohio’s Constitution authorizes a 
municipality to exercise all powers of local self-government within its 
jurisdiction.”162 Where, however, there is a conflict of Ohio’s concurrent police 
powers, the state’s exercise prevails if the state’s authority is derived from a “general 
law” within the meaning Art. XVIII, Section 3.163 
In Canton v. Ohio, the Ohio Supreme Court defined a “general law,” as a statute 
that is (1) part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment; (2) applies to 
all parts of the state alike and operates uniformly throughout the sate; (3) sets forth 
police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit 
municipalities’ legislative power to do so, and (4) prescribes a rule of conduct upon 
citizens generally.164 
1. A Statute Creating Regional Governments Is Part of a Statewide and 
Comprehensive Legislative Enactment 
If a state statute concerns subject matter that affects the general public as a whole 
more than local inhabitants, the statute is “part of a statewide and comprehensive 
                                                                                                                                         
N.E.2d 370; Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 3d 170, 2006-Ohio-
6043, 858 N.E.2d 776. 
 157 See Shwab, supra note 26, at 480-93. 
 158 OH. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the 
130th GA 2013-2014).   
 159 See City of Canton v. Ohio, 95 Ohio St. 3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, at ¶ 
21. 
 160 OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Files 24 and 26 to 38 of the 
130th GA 2013-2014).   
 161 See Canton, 766 N.E.2d, at ¶ 10.  
 162 Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 116 Ohio St. 3d 553, 2008-Ohio-92, 880 N.E.2d 
906, at ¶ 10 (quoting Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 3d 170, 2006-
Ohio-6043, 858 N.E.2d 776). 
 163 See id. 
 164 Canton, 766 N.E.2d, at ¶ 21. 
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legislative enactment”165 to satisfy the first element of the Canton test.166 In Ohio 
Ass’n of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. N. Olmstead, the Ohio Supreme Court 
said “[a] general law has been described as one which promotes statewide 
uniformity.”167 The Ohio Supreme Court has upheld natural resource conservation168 
and matters with extraterritorial impact as areas of statewide concern.169 There is no 
need for a “comprehensive enactment” to regulate every aspect of the disputed 
conduct.170  
Ohio Revised Code (O.R.C.) § 1509.02 preempts a locality’s ability to zone 
when the zoning issue concerns a matter of statewide concern.171 
The [division of oil and gas resources management] has sole and 
exclusive authority to regulate the . . . location[] and spacing of oil and 
gas wells and production operations within the state . . . . The regulation 
of oil and gas activities is a matter of general statewide interest that 
requires uniform statewide regulation . . . .172 
In Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., the Ohio Supreme Court upheld O.R.C. § 
1509.02 as constitutional under the home-rule amendment because the statute is a 
general law.173 In analyzing whether § 1509.02 was a general law, the Ninth District 
Court of Appeals “beg[an] with the recognition that [the] oil and gas drilling statute 
specifically states that the regulation of oil and gas activities is a matter of general 
statewide interest that requires uniform statewide regulation.”174 The Ninth District 
held in Smith Family Trust v. Hudson Bd. of Zoning Appeals that § “1509 et seq. 
regulates the conservation of natural resources and is unquestionably a general 
law.”175   
                                                                                                                                         
 165 Id. at 964. 
 166 See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. City of Painesville, 239 N.E.2d 75, 78 (Ohio 
1968). 
 167 Ohio Ass’n of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. City of N. Olmsted, 602 N.E.2d 1147, 
1149 (Ohio 1992).  
 168 See Columbus v. Teater, 374 N.E.2d 154, 158-59 (Ohio 1978). 
 169 Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections of Cuyahoga Cnty., 148 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ohio 1958). 
 170 City of Cleveland v. Ohio, 128 Ohio St. 3d 135, 2010-Ohio-6318, 942 N.E.2d 370, at ¶ 
21 (citing Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 116 Ohio St. 3d 553, 2008-Ohio-92, 880 
N.E.2d 906). 
 171 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.02 (West, Westlaw through 2013 File 59 of the 130th 
General Assembly). 
 172 Id.  
 173 State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No. 2013–0465, 2015-Ohio-485, at ¶ 23 
(Ohio Feb. 17, 2015). 
 174 State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 2013-Ohio-356, 989 N.E.2d 85, at ¶ 54 
(9th Dist.) (quoting Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, 120 Ohio St. 3d 96, 
2008-Ohio-4605, 896 N.E.2d 967, at ¶ 29.).  
 175 Smith Family Trust v. City of Hudson Bd. of Zoning and Bldg. Appeals, 9th Dist. 
Summit No. 24471 2009-Ohio-2557, ¶ 11. 
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Similarly, in determining whether a law is part of statewide and comprehensive 
legislative enactment, the Court in Cleveland v. Ohio stated in 2010 that “we took 
into account that the General Assembly had ‘express[ed] its intent for statewide 
comprehensive [laws].”176 The legislative history of the statute in question in 
Cleveland indicated the intent to supersede the existing patchwork of ordinances.177   
Thus, statutory language expressing the intent of the General Assembly to 
supersede the patchwork of zoning ordinances and promote the state’s interest in 
combating the extraterritorial impact of urban sprawl would satisfy the first element 
of the Canton test.178 
2. A Statute Creating Regional Governments Applies to All Parts of the State Alike 
and Operates Uniformly throughout the State 
 Legislation creating regional governments in each of Ohio’s regions would 
“apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly”179 to satisfy the second 
element of the Canton test. Because no locality operates autonomously and regional 
governments should be created in each economically interconnected region to be 
constitutional, the statute would apply “to all parts of the state alike.”180   
The purpose of the uniformity element “is not ‘to render invalid every law which 
does not operate upon all persons, property, or political subdivisions within the 
state,’ but simply to ensure that a general law operates uniformly with respect to 
every person and locality to which it relates.”181 In Ohioans for Concealed Carry, 
Inc. v. City of Clyde, the Ohio Supreme Court held that application of a statutory 
framework inherently varies by jurisdiction.182 In a 2014 Cleveland v. Ohio decision, 
the Ohio Supreme Court upheld a state statute that expressly preempted a 
municipality’s ability to regulate tow truck companies.183 Although the application of 
this statute would impact Ohio regions differently, the court held that because the 
statute’s scope is statewide and there is no limitation upon the statute’s operation, the 
statute is uniform throughout the state.184  
                                                                                                                                         
 176 Cleveland, 942 N.E.2d, at ¶ 24. 
 177 Id. at ¶ 24.  
 178 See Ohio Ass’n of Private Detective Agencies, Inc. v. City of N. Olmsted, 602 N.E.2d 
1147, 1149 (Ohio 1992); Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections of Cuyahoga Cnty., 148 N.E.2d 921, 
922-23 (Ohio 1958). 
 179 City of Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St. 3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, at ¶ 21. 
 180 See id.  
 181 State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No. 2013–0465, 2015-Ohio-485, at ¶ 21 
(Ohio Feb. 17, 2015) (citations omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Stanton v. Powell, 142 N.E. 401 
(Ohio 1924)).  
 182 Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, 120 Ohio St. 3d 96, 2008-Ohio-
4605, 896 N.E.2d 967, at ¶ 43.  
 183 City of Cleveland v. State, 138 Ohio St. 3d 232, 2014-Ohio-86, 5 N.E.3d 644, at ¶ 5.  
 184 Id. at ¶ 12.  
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Because a statute creating regional governments would have the uniform 
framework of promoting regional coordination upon all parts of the state alike, the 
second element of the Canton test would be satisfied.185 
3. A Statute Deferring Regulatory Power to Implement Interlocal Coordination to 
Regional Governments Sets Forth Police Regulations 
The third element of the Canton test would be satisfied because decentralizing 
land-use authority to regional governments “set[s] forth police [power] 
regulations”186 that a locality’s zoning be in accordance with regional policy, “rather 
than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation.”187   
This element requires that “a statute which prohibits the exercise by a 
municipality of its home[-]rule powers[,] without such statute serving an overriding 
statewide interest[,] would directly contravene the constitutional grant of municipal 
power.”188  
In the 2014 Cleveland decision, the Ohio Supreme Court said that in determining 
whether a statute establishes police regulations, the statute should also be read in 
conjunction with the delegated agency’s regulations.189 A regional government that 
is delegated authority to implement regional coordination could promulgate specific 
regulations to ensure that localities’ land-use decisions are in accordance with 
regional policy to serve a statewide interest.   
In Morrison, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the state reserving for itself “the 
permitting, location, and spacing of oil and gas wells” under § 1509.02 is a 
legitimate state interest.190 Similarly, a statute creating regional governments to serve 
the state interest in efficient regional land-use coordination is legitimate.191 Like § 
1509.02, a statute creating regional governments would “preserve . . . regulatory 
control given to municipalities” but at the same time prevent municipalities from 
“exercising those powers in a way that . . . impedes” the state’s interest in regional 
coordination.192  
Thus, like § 1509.02 under Morrison, a statute creating regional governments 
could set forth a specific police power to regulate the land use of a specific subject, 
except instead of “oil and gas wells” with regional governments it would be regional 
land-use coordination.193 Because such a statute would set forth a police power 
regulation and only limit the legislative power of a municipal corporation when in 
                                                                                                                                         
 185 See id.  
 186 City of Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St. 3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, at ¶ 21.  
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at ¶ 32 (quoting Clermont Env’t Reclamation Co. v. Wiederhold, 442 N.E.2d 1278, 
1282 (Ohio 1982)).  
 189 Cleveland, 5 N.E.3d 644, at ¶ 13.  
 190 See State ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., No. 2013–0465, 2015-Ohio-485, at ¶ 
30 (Ohio Feb. 17, 2015). 
 191 See id.  
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conflict with the state’s interest in regional coordination, the third element of the 
Canton test would be satisfied.194   
4. A Statute Creating Regional Governments Prescribes a Rule of Conduct on 
Citizens Generally 
 The fourth element of the Canton test that “prescribe[s] a rule of conduct on 
citizens generally”195 requires that a statute apply generally to all who would fall 
within the sphere of its legislation.196 In American Fin. Services Ass’n v. City of 
Cleveland, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the statute, which prevented lenders 
from engaging in predatory lending, prescribed a rule of conduct on citizens 
generally because the statute specifically prescribed a rule of conduct on all state 
lenders.197 Also, in the 2014 Cleveland decision, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a 
statute that expressly preempted a municipality’s ability to regulate tow truck 
companies prescribed a rule of conduct upon citizens generally because “the statute 
applies to all entities engaged in towing operations.”198   
Similarly, a statute applying to all Ohio localities to regionally coordinate 
through the mechanism of a regional government would satisfy the fourth element of 
the Canton test to prescribe a rule of conduct on citizens generally.199 
5. By the Ohio General Assembly Expressing a Clear Intent to Further the State 
Interest of Regional Coordination, a Statute Creating Regional Governments Would 
Constitute a General Law  
 Because a statute creating regional governments in each economically 
interconnected Ohio region can satisfy all four prongs of the Canton test, this statute 
would constitute a “general law” within the meaning of Article XVIII, Section 3.200 
“Although the courts have established some basic principles regarding home[-]rule 
powers, they are not always consistently applied.”201 But as demonstrated, courts 
have not been willing to construe the home-rule amendment broadly when the 
General Assembly has demonstrated a clear intent to divest localities of the power in 
furtherance of a state interest.202   
Because it is in the state’s interest to control urban sprawl, protect Ohio’s natural 
resources, and benefit metropolitan economies, statutory authority preempting local 
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land-use planning is constitutional.203 As Morrison demonstrated, a statute that 
curtails a locality’s zoning authority for specific state interests is constitutional.204 As 
a general law with the specific state interest of facilitating regional coordination, the 
statutory enactment of regional governments would be constitutional, even in the 
face of Ohio’s home-rule amendment.205 
A. The Need for a Statutory Enactment Creating Regional Governments 
The reason regional governments, as opposed to public state agencies, are 
necessary is because citizens need to foster a regional consciousness for meaningful 
regional coordination to occur.206 “Political cooperation . . . must be the first step 
towards regional cooperation.”207 Because government is accountable to voters, a 
regional government would facilitate both legitimacy among voters and the idea of 
regional citizenship.208 “To be effective, a regional legislature would have the power 
to ensure that its decisions, once made, will be followed by a region’s cities,”209 and 
a legitimate regional government would help maintain this authority. 
Although annexation statutes are a step in the right direction towards creating 
more regional forms of government, the statutes can facilitate interlocal conflict and 
exacerbate a region’s ability to foster a regional consciousness.210 For example, 
although regionalists have long touted North Carolina’s progressive state municipal 
annexation laws, these same laws have sparked “significant annexation wars” and “a 
number of lawsuits.”211 When the City of Buffalo attempted to merge into its 
surrounding county, Erie County, in 2004, proponents of the measure met resistance 
among those who saw it as attempting to augment suburban power at the expense of 
city residents.212 “[H]ad genuine input from numerous stakeholders and ordinary 
citizens generated proposals for regionalism, [the proposal] could have survived 
. . . .”213 
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Furthermore, imposing regional governance on an existing governmental entity 
may only be a short-term solution.214 Major metropolitan areas today are far larger in 
population and territory than the largest city in the region.215 “[E]ven in New York 
[City], success was ultimately undone by the expansion of the metropolitan area 
beyond the boundaries of the consolidated city.”216 Thus, the question as to what 
governmental scale would appropriately be commensurate with a given region will 
fluidly change over time, requiring a dynamic entity able to respond to the regional 
issues of the time.217 Because a regional government, on the other hand, is merely a 
vehicle for regional collaboration, it can more quickly respond to changing regional 
issues.218   
“No meaningful regional consciousness, let alone regional citizenship, now exists 
in major American metropolitan areas.”219 However, unlike annexed or consolidated 
localities, “a regional citizenship is a worthwhile goal because it would help foster 
the kind of regional thinking needed to address metropolitan problems.”220  
Regional governments should not only “serve as a vehicle for intercity 
negotiations designed to forge a regional perspective”221 but also an authority on 
policies that bind regions.222 Because local land-use “is a major source of 
metropolitan externalities,” regional authority should be broad enough to include 
land-use decisions.223 A legitimate regional government with sufficient power to 
preempt local land-use decisions would help generate the idea of regional 
citizenship.224 Regional policies will require an understanding of how one locality’s 
policies impact a region, which would help address localities’ regional ignorance 
embodied in the information problem.225 
Localists validly argue that regionalism threatens their local autonomy by 
making it more difficult for them to effect change in larger governments and 
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removing the choice of living under low-cost government.226 But “in light of the 
intertwined relationships of local areas in metropolitan regions, we should redefine 
the scope of local autonomy . . . .”227 Local governments are not receptive to regional 
issues, which threatens residents’ local autonomy to have a voice in policies that 
affect them.228 Although there is evidence that a multitude of governments in a 
metropolitan area hold down local government costs, this argument disregards the 
costs associated with infrastructure and governmental overlap created by a profusion 
of government within a region.229 
Contrary to arguments made by localists,230 regional governments would 
facilitate community and civic participation by helping citizens recognize themselves 
as part of a regional community.231 By focusing on the local community, citizens 
blind themselves to the regional community “economically and socially intertwined” 
with one’s locality.232 “The defining feature of traditional localities—intensity of 
interaction within the locality and separation of that locality from others—are 
increasingly absent in the metropolitan setting.”233   
Metropolitan residents don’t focus their activities strictly within their localities, 
and metropolitan businesses don’t draw most of their customers and employees from 
their home localities.234 But even though metropolitan residents have increasingly 
interacted with their metropolitan areas, today “local boundaries often become the 
basis of interlocal conflicts.”235 Under our current governmental structure, there is a 
“winner take all” situation when one locality, for example, builds a shopping 
center.236 This shopping center may negatively affect businesses in neighboring 
localities.237 But the locality building the shopping center is typically only concerned 
with its residents and interests.238 Regional government could mitigate this conflict 
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by facilitating citizens’ regional consciousness and providing a means to civically 
address interlocal disputes.239 
B. How Regional Governments Present a More Effective Structure for the Economic 
Health of Ohio’s Regions 
 Because today’s citizen is a regional creature, our current governmental structure 
isn’t adequately addressing citizens’ needs.240 This structure inefficiently wastes 
resources by increasing costs of governmental services, urban sprawl, and individual 
expenditures.241 Regional governments would more effectively address these issues 
through the lens of regional solutions.242 Furthermore, regional governments would 
facilitate the regional consciousness necessary to implement meaningful, long-term 
regional coordination.243 
1. Regional Governments Would More Efficiently Streamline Regional 
Infrastructure and Government 
 Regional planning can drive down costs by streamlining capital investment, 
maintenance, and the infrastructure and governmental overlap incidental to urban 
sprawl.244 “[T]he marginal cost of new development closer to existing services or 
facilities is lower. However, because costs currently are evenly distributed among all 
users by average-cost pricing, those who live further away pay proportionately less. 
As a result, some users subsidize other users.”245  
Bills for services, like water and sewer services, are assessed on an average cost 
basis.246 Even though new development makes providing these services more 
expensive, politicians don’t marginally price these services to reflect the costs 
because they “don’t like to charge voters one rate and others a different one.”247 
Thus, the problem is a political one, and a regional government could help eliminate 
this political dilemma and align costs with services by setting regional policy, like a 
regional growth boundary.248 
Regional governments can also improve efficiency by providing visibility of 
overlapping governmental functions with duplicative services that “hire too many for 
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little in return.”249 This could be done by requiring interlocal negotiations while 
initiating informational campaigns that inform citizens of governmental overlap and 
the possible savings that could be gained through integration.250 Visibility of these 
inefficiencies and forced negotiation could streamline governmental costs across 
localities.251 “Greater Cleveland’s population problem screams out for regional 
government . . . . The result is a massive waste of tax dollars by the central city and 
suburbs, a waste that cries out for more shared services between municipalities, if 
not outright mergers.”252 
2. Regional Governments Would More Effectively Address Regional Land-Use 
Issues Like Urban Sprawl 
 Effective regional land-use policies over time can both reduce costs and generate 
regional economic growth.253 Some regional land-use issues, like urban sprawl, can 
only be addressed by regional policies because they are not the result of a single 
locality’s externalities imposed on the region but the aggregate result of local 
decisions.254 “[T]he local government system makes it difficult for localities to take 
action to control sprawl.”255 However, as Portland, Oregon has demonstrated, a 
metropolitan growth boundary created by its regional government can effectively 
deal with this problem.256 
Policies that curb urban sprawl will capture more of the metropolitan growth in 
the existing metropolitan area.257 This could result in more investment in 
metropolitan inner cities; a rejuvenated image of the face of the region to attract new 
businesses, tourists, and residents; and a benefit to the economic health of the entire 
region.258 “The central city typically shapes outsiders’ images of the region and 
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thereby determines the region’s capacity to attract firms, high-skilled workers, and 
tourists and conventioneers.”259 
“[A] growing body of research . . . suggests a tie between suburban growth and 
the economic health of central cities.”260 The high correlation between city and 
suburban growth in employment, income, and population indicates that the 
metropolitan area is an economically integrated entity “whose various component 
local parts tend to rise or fall together.”261 Thus, it makes little sense for a region’s 
components to win at the expense of another.262 
Former leader of the Cuyahoga County Mayors and Managers Association, 
Bruce Akers has spent more than a decade trying push a new model of regional 
cooperation that is premised on two ideas: (1) every community in greater Cleveland 
will sink or swim together; and (2) Cleveland’s fate will dictate everyone else’s.263  
Another policy that would more effectively be addressed by regional 
governments would be regional agreement to mitigate the use of exclusionary zoning 
and implement more mixed-use areas.264 A mixed-use area mixes “different land 
uses, often placing housing near shops, or offices above storefronts.”265 A defining 
characteristic of sprawl is the strict segregation of different land-uses.266 In sprawling 
regions, housing is typically separated from shopping, offices, civic centers, and 
schools.267 This separation creates an imbalance, where workers cannot find housing 
close to work and exacerbates sprawl by requiring workers to live in further 
localities.268   
Mixed-use zoning eliminates this separation and, consequently, curbs regional 
sprawl.269 Regional policies that require localities to implement mixed-use zoning 
would reduce the ability for localities to use exclusionary zoning to grow their tax 
bases.270 Reduced exclusionary zoning no longer diverts as much metropolitan 
burdens to its neighbors, which would not only combat sprawl by providing cheaper 
housing options in these localities but also reduce the incentive for new homebuyers 
to seek cheap housing in the metropolitan fringe areas.271 
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Although less effective,272 the Twin Cities tax-base-sharing model is another way 
to combat regional sprawl.273 “[T]ax-base sharing weakens [governmental] incentive 
to waste taxpayer dollars by stealing it away from other communities . . . [or] restrict 
residential development to profitable types of housing, making efficient land-use 
planning easier.”274 The Twin cities model shows that by capturing the growth in the 
tax base, this diminishes the incentive for a locality to engage in exclusionary 
zoning.275 By mitigating the incentive for Twin City localities to vie for revenue-
generating land uses, their incentives are more aligned “to engage in more thoughtful 
and beneficial land-use planning.”276 
Tax-base-sharing also reduces tax disparities within a region and levels the 
playing field in encouraging reinvestment in regional inner-cities and other fiscally 
distressed communities.277 Because tax-base-sharing reduces the incentive for 
localities to compete in drawing a region’s wealthy through lower tax rates, the Twin 
cities area manifests less of a tax-rate disparity.278 “As a result of the sharing 
program, local tax-base disparities narrowed significantly (by roughly twenty 
percent).”279 
3. Curbing Urban Sprawl Will Reduce Costs Imposed on Individuals 
Urban sprawl imposes quantifiable costs by requiring individuals living in 
sprawling regions to drive more miles, suffer more traffic accidents, own more cars, 
pay for more car insurance, and breathe more polluted air.280 In a 2002 study by 
Smart Growth America, sprawl was found to be a greater predictor than numerous 
demographic control variables to higher rates of driving and vehicle ownership.281 
“Average household vehicle ownership is an indicator of the degree to which a 
region’s population is dependent on automobiles for basic transportation . . . in 
sprawling areas where driving is the only way to get around, more households feel 
compelled to have a vehicle for each licensed driver.”282   
Because mass-transit requires that most journeys be concentrated to a limited 
number of destinations, the dispersed nature of regional sprawl precludes mass 
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transit.283 Thus, urban sprawl has a major influence on energy consumption and other 
individual costs incidental to vehicle-miles traveled.284 
By reducing sprawl, the number of commuters walking, biking, or taking transit 
to work increases significantly.285 The metropolitan areas that are more sprawling 
have 2.3 percent of workers taking public transportation to work, while less 
sprawling areas have 5.1 percent of workers taking public transportation.286 
“[R]esearch has been piling up that establishes a link between the spread of sprawl 
and the rise of obesity in our country.”287 In an interview with Richard Jackson, MD, 
a pediatrician and chair of the Environmental and Health Sciences at UCLA, said 
that New Yorkers, the ultimate walkers, weigh on average six or seven pounds less 
than suburban Americans.288 As the distance among where we live, work, shop and 
socialize increases, more time is spent in the car and less times is spent exercising.289 
4. Atlanta’s Sprawl 
Atlanta is consistently included as one of the most sprawling metropolitan areas 
in the country.290 In ranking 83 metropolitan areas by Smart Growth America, 
Atlanta was ranked 4th most sprawling.291 “The Atlanta metro area is hyper-
expanded to a space larger than the entirety of Massachusetts.”292 Between 1990 and 
2006, Atlanta’s metropolitan area expanded 47 percent and today is the least densely 
populated metropolitan area in the country.293    
Atlanta is also consistently ranked as one of the worst commuter cities in the 
country.294 This was evident on January 28, 2014,295 when Atlanta suffered from a 
snowstorm that stranded thousands on its roads and required authorities to help 
motorists in rescue efforts.296 “The proximate cause of the . . . traffic catastrophe . . . 
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is a normally warm area grappling with unusual snowfall. But the larger story here is 
that . . . [Atlanta is] really a mess as far as a regional transportation planning 
viewpoint.”297 
The Atlanta metropolitan area has 16,000 miles of roads, the second-highest 
miles per capita of metropolitan areas in the country.298 In 2013, the American Lung 
Association ranked Atlanta 18 out of 277 metropolitan areas for annual particle 
pollution.299 The region’s growth has depleted water resources in the area, raising 
concerns about water quantity and quality.300 Half of all Georgians drink water from 
the Chattahoochee River, and the river’s water quality is being threatened by 
rampant suburban growth.301 
In response, the Georgia General Assembly established The Georgia Regional 
Transportation Authority in 1999 to oversee transportation and land use and promote 
smart growth measures to bring businesses closer to homes.302 These measures have 
achieved some success, as Atlanta has reversed its long population decline303 and 
grew about 6 percent over the past couple of years.304  
But the Atlanta area still has a ways to go to realize a regional consciousness.305 
In 2013, the Atlanta Braves announced that they were moving twelve miles 
northwest of Atlanta to Cobb County.306 “When we talk about sharing the cost of our 
regional infrastructure, that does not mean duplicating an existing stadium . . . . That 
is not regionalism. That is one county government looking out for its own self-
interest at the expense of another government . . . .”307 
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5. Regional Governments Would Facilitate the Regional Consciousness Necessary 
for Meaningful, Long-Term Regional Coordination 
 Given that there are no metropolitan areas today governed by a single all-
encompassing general-purpose government,308 the political challenges are immense. 
In response to the Northeast Ohio Sustainable Community’s Coalition’s (NEOSCC) 
initiative to present a regional plan for Northeast Ohio, the Wayne County Tea Party 
wrote on its website that the “NEOCC is pushing this baloney about looking into the 
future and putting our people into high-density areas to live using bicycles and mass 
transportation in the future.”309    
But these challenges are slowly being eroded: walkable neighborhoods are 
gaining momentum in the real estate market with more baby boomers preferring the 
greater convenience of in-town living;310 public officials are looking to regionalism 
to shore up the fiscal health of their municipalities;311 and metropolitan areas are 
looking to regional cooperation for development.312   
There is also a generational shift, as demonstrated by a 2011 survey by real estate 
firm Robert Charles Lesser & Co., where 77 percent of millennials said they planned 
to live in the “urban core.”313 CNN reported on January 2, 2015 that public 
transportation use across the country has risen twelve of the past fifteen quarters.314 
“Since 2007, Americans have been driving less . . . . The public transportation 
industry says commuters could gain an average annual savings of $9,635 by taking 
public transit instead of driving.”315 
Higher fuel costs are also changing our behavior.316 The building of the suburbs 
was built on the assumption of cheap oil.317 However, from 2000 to 2008, the 
inflation adjusted price of a barrel of crude oil rose by 166 percent.318 “It’s no 
coincidence that where gas costs more-in Europe, for example, there is less 
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sprawl.”319 Rising fuel prices are trumping the notion that housing is cheaper the 
further you travel from the metropolitan center.320 
Corporate headquarters are beginning to relocate back to cities from their 
massive suburban office parks.321 In Chicago, United Airlines, Hillshire Brands, and 
Motorola Mobility each moved their headquarters from the suburbs to the city within 
the last ten years.322 In Detroit, Quicken Loans relocated from suburban Livonia to 
the city in 2011. In Philadelphia, venture capital firm First Round Capital moved 
from the suburbs to the city in 2012.323 In San Francisco, some of the newest start-
ups are shirking Silicon Valley for the city, like Twitter, Zynga, Airbnb, Dropbox, 
Uber, Pinterest, and Yelp.324 “The list goes on and on as companies competing for 
younger workers realize they need to move to where the talent wants to live.”325  
According to a report published on February 24, 2014 by City Observatory, a 
think tank, city-center employment has grown in recent years, leaving less people 
employed in the surrounding suburbs.326 The report found that employment within a 
three-mile radius of central business districts climbed half a percent between 2007 
and 2011, while employment in the surrounding metropolitan areas declined one-
tenth of a percent.327 “People increasingly desire to live, work, shop and play in the 
same place, and to commute shorter distances—particularly the young and educated, 
who are the most coveted employees.”328 Also, employers are increasingly realizing 
the economic benefit of working in the urban core: “For a certain sector of 
knowledge jobs, ideas bloom from spontaneous, face-to-face interaction in coffee 
shops or elevators.”329   
But to implement meaningful, long-term regional coordination, a regional 
consciousness is critical.330 Regional consciousness is critical to create regions that 
work together, rather than against one another.331 David Beach said that one way to 
muster political support for smart growth reform in Ohio would be to appeal to 
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citizens’ local and regional sensibilities to instill a regional consciousness.332 A 
regional consciousness defeats this us-versus-them mentality.333 “Regional land[-]use 
planning and regional redistribution are unlikely to occur without some clear sense 
among area residents of the region as a distinct community with shared interests and 
a common fate.”334 If a region more equitably distributes metropolitan growth and 
costs, this could mitigate racial, social, and political tensions, which both reduces the 
costs of these social problems and reinforces a positive image of the region.335  
For instance, instead of concentrating a region’s poor into its inner cities, 
regional policies could require affordable housing across localities to make a region 
more economically homogenous. Economic segregation is correlated with higher 
crime and unemployment rates.336 “[A]s the disparity in per capita income between 
the central city and its suburbs rises, the overall economic health of the metropolitan 
region declines . . . . Areas with near parity in per capita income or in which the city 
had higher per capita income showed even greater employment growth.”337 Lower 
crime rates would reduce the costs of hiring law enforcement and facilitate economic 
growth by creating a safer environment for business.338   
When the Twin Cities created the first metropolitan government in the country 
with the authority over regional tax-base-sharing in 1975,339 criticism at the time 
labeled the initiative as economic socialism340 and central-city versus suburban 
warfare.341 But “[t]he Act’s ultimate success required a unique coalition of central-
city and suburban legislators working together to ensure the future economic vitality 
of the entire state.”342 Faced with rising public discontent over soaring property 
taxes, disparities in education between property-tax-rich and property-tax-poor 
districts, and the precarious conditions of municipality fiscal health within the 
region, the Act ultimately succeeded.343   
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Because U.S. Census Bureau estimates show that “four northern Ohio counties 
ranked among the top 10 nationally for losing population” from 2011-2012,344 Ohio 
may be ripe for political change. Even affluent communities today are beginning to 
realize that they can’t stand alone in providing governmental services.345 The Mayor 
of Hudson, Ohio, an affluent Cleveland and Akron suburb,346 has called for regional 
tax-sharing, even though he acknowledges the political obstacles of such a 
measure.347 “But he thinks that Northeast Ohio has no choice but to change.” When 
regions are becoming increasingly insolvent and disparate, “there are two viable 
options: either allow the disparity to deepen or work to find solutions that can benefit 
all.”348   
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although home-rule principles may have been appropriate in 1912, when 
localities were economically autonomous entities with available land to continue to 
grow, today “local fiscal health depends primarily on the health of the regional 
economy and on social conditions within the locality, which are largely beyond the 
power of localities, to control.”349 Fundamentally, the problem is informational, 
where citizens are blinded from regional policies that significantly affect their lives.  
The Ohio General Assembly should address this information problem by creating 
regional governments. Regional governments would not only provide citizens a 
vehicle to participate in policies that affect them but would also reduce costs and 
promote regional growth. Regional governments could reduce costs by requiring 
interlocal negotiations and shedding light on these inefficiencies. Effective regional 
policies could curb aggregate externalities, like urban sprawl, and promote 
investment in the existing metropolitan area.   
However, regional governments will also be beneficial to Ohio’s regions by 
driving long-term regional coordination through developing a regional consciousness 
among its citizenry.350 Through regional government, Ohio can more efficiently 
expend its resources and have greater control in investing in the economic engine of 
its regions by investing in regional inner cities. 
This is particularly important today, when American metropolitan areas compete 
globally.351 In a 2013 interview Blair Rubel, Director of the Wilson Center’s Global 
Sustainability and Resilience Center, said,  
If you take a look at places that are doing relatively better, there are lot of 
experiments that are taking place in Latin America-a lot of improvement 
in Latin American cities.  Brazilian cities are probably cutting edge in 
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terms of urban management . . . . Unfortunately, we in the United States 
are so taken with our exceptional status, that we often don’t look at 
experiments that are taking place outside the United States.352   
The greater efficiency and effective investment that regional government could 
provide Ohio’s regions can make Ohio’s metropolitan areas more globally 
competitive and return economic benefits to Ohio’s regions and the state as a whole.  
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